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JOINT ENTERPRISES
B E.A.'s relationship with Aer Lingus is a more unusual joint enter-
prise, as the following paragraphs of their agreement 27 of May 6,
1946 may indicate:
"1. Aer Rianta and British Airways consider that in the interest of econ-
omy and efficiency a single unit should be formed for the purpose of operating
air services between Ireland and the United Kingdom, and furthermore that
close cooperation should exist between them within the European zone.
"3. The capital of Aer Lingus shall be held as to 60% by Aer Rianta and
as to 40% by British Airways and/or British European Airways Corporation
(which, when formed, shall be afforded an opportunity of becoming a party to
this agreement). Neither party shall dispose of any of its shares without the
consent of the other.
"4. The number of directors shall be not more than seven, of whom four,
including the Chairman, shall be appointed by Aer Rianta and three by Brit-
ish Airways.
"8. Operations on the Continent of Europe and elsewhere where competi-
tion between British Airways and the proposed company may arise shall be
the subject of prior discussion and agreement.
"9. As British Airways has a 50% interest in the traffic operating between
Ireland and the United Kingdom it is agreed that the profits and losses aris-
ing from services between Ireland and the United Kingdom shall be shared
equally between the parties.
"10. Any profits accruing from the operation of services from Ireland to
any of the following cities; namely, Paris, Rome, Brussels, Amsterdam,
Copenhagen, Oslo, Stockholm, shall be divided between the parties hereto in
accordance with their respective shareholdings in the proposed company.
Any losses incurred in the operation of the above services shall be shared
equally between the parties hereto. Any further services to the Continent of
Europe which may from time to time be under consideration shall be the sub-
ject of prior discussion and agreement between the parties hereto."
This contract appears to combine large shareholdings with strong
representation on the Board and a sort of pool. The arrangement
seems to have worked out fairly well in general, and has been cheered
by those who deplore narrow nationalistic antagonisms and favor coop-
eration between the United Kingdom and Ireland.
27 ICAO Doe. 4954, AT/633-Ireland, pp. 5-6.
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There have been two other cases involving the investment of U.S.
capital and management experience which have been received less
warmly, for the motives of the purchasers have been questioned.
When Seaboard and Western Airlines, a thriving American non-sched-
uled cargo carrier on the North Atlantic, bought approximately 35%
of Luxembourg Airlines in 1949 the U.S. and U.K. hardly bothered to
conceal their beliefs that there is no longer "effective control" 28 in
Luxembourg nationals and that Seaboard acquired the shares 29 to by-
pass the statutory requirements of Sec. 401 of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 and secure landing rights under Sec. 402 as a "foreign air car-
rier" or under Section 6 (c) of the U.S. Air Commerce Act of 1926.
The shortage of 4-engine equipment which arose from the air lift to
Korea has postponed Luxembourg's plans for trans-Atlantic "coach"
flights on a scheduled basis, and that carrier now waits to gain the full
benefits of Seaboard's considerable operating experience. On the other
hand, Aerovias Venezuela Europa is utilizing to the utmost the practi-
cal talents of its U.S. shareholders who own 45% of the stock, and
observers in Rome note with interest the active role of Executive Vice
President James Wooten who has 221/% of the shares. A.V.E. is a
duly incorporated and certificated Venezuelan carrier operating sched-
uled services between Caracas and Rome via Lisbon, Madrid and Paris.
Mr. Wooten is active in several ventures in which his capital and
knowledge of air transport are combined with foreign funds and corpo-
rate structure. Venezuela has been glad to benefit from his wide expe-
rience and ingenuity, and the government has extended its good-will
and diplomatic blessing.
With 55% of the stock in Venezuelan hands and a former Air Min-
ister as titular president, it would not be easy to prove that A.V.E. is
not a bona fide Venezuelan company. Such was not the case with Peru-
vian International Airways, for its chief executive had been prominent
as a U.S. Army Air Forces general and the Peruvian Ministry of Aero-
nautics told the CAB in Washington that 40.5% of the shares were
owned by Canadians and 27.5% by U.S. citizens. Of the 10 directors, 6
were American and Canadian. The carrier received a permit to enter
the U.S. as a Peruvian operator on the basis of a 1946 bilateral agree-
ment which pledged that 51% of the stock would be in Peruvian hands
by 1956. In 1948, however, the entire problem was solved when the
company collapsed with heavy losses.
INTERNATIONAL OWNERSHIP
So many and varied arrangements have passed under the shelter of
the imposing phrase "international cooperation in air transport," but
28 Under (7) of the "Standard Agreement" developed at the Chicago Confer-
ence, "each contracting party reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate
or permit to an airline of another State in any case where it is not satisfied that
substantial ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of a party to
this Agreement ... "
29 Formerly owned by Scottish Aviation, Ltd.
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most of them have been very different in purpose and nature from true
international owership. Indeed, it was the evils which arose in the era
of restrictions and economic-political sniping that focused attention
upon the possibilities of international ownership. The United King-
dom set forth 30 the problem at the Fourth Assembly of ICAO in Mont-
real in June, 1950:
"Among some of the major drawbacks of the present system of com-
peting national airlines which would be overcome by international own-
ership and operation are:--
(a) As an infant industry, not yet economically self-supporting, air
transport requires subsidy assistance either in the form of pay-
ments to operators and/or through the provision of expensive aero-
dromes and facilities in return for uneconomic rates of landing fees.(b) Air transport is an instrument of national policy in every country
of standing. Hence, competitive exploitation by national interests
is not prompted in all countries solely by commercial motives. It
follows, therefore, that many countries, almost regardless of cost in
subsidies are prepared to maintain air transport services without
economic justification. This led to a situation in pre-war Europe in
which 75% of the cost of the many airlines competing for European
traffic was borne by the taxpayer. The number of competing coun-
tries and airlines is greater today.(c) In order to minimize losses, most competing national airlines actu-
ated solely by commercial motives concentrate on 'paying routes'
and neglect the development of services that are needed in wider
public interest.(d) The drive to eliminate competition in the struggle for supremacy,
leads to artificial inflation of capacity, constant pressure to reduce
fares below economic levels and other competitive devices.(e) The tendency of each country to surround its international air
transport with a protective ringed fence based on a restrictive pol-
icy in the grant of commercial rights, stultifies the full development
of efficient air services on an economical basis."
The history of international ownership goes back to "the Com-
pagnie Franco-Roumaine de Navigation aerienne (later known as
CIDNA) established in 1920, on French initiative to operate air serv-
ices between Paris and Bucharest via Prague-Vienna-Budapest and Bel-
grade. The company was of French nationality, but the various
countries it served contributed towards its operation, either by provid-
ing a share of the capital or by means of subsidies, or else by means of
contribution in kind such as the provision of fuel. In return, the com-
pany was under an obligation to employ in each country flight crews of
the nationality of the country." 81
It was in this same period that Germany and Soviet Russia set up
the little-publicized joint air transport venture known as Deruluft to
operate between Moscow and Berlin, and this company was flying addi-
tional routes when service was suspended in 1937.
80 Paper on "International Ownership and Operation of International Air
Services" submitted by U.K. to 4th ICAO Assembly, A4-WP/118 EC/14, 5/6/50,
p. 3.31 French memorandum cited note 4, p. 17.
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Qantas Empire Airways and Tasman Empire Airways
Both of these organizations involved more active participation by
the partners than did the companies in which the United Kingdom has
joined with the Australians and New Zealanders:
"Qantas Empire Airways was established in 1934 by Imperial
Airways and the Australian company, Queensland and Northern
Territory Aerial Services (QANTAS). The capital stock of Qan-
tas Empire Airways, Ltd. was equally divided between the two par-
ticipating companies.
"Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd. operated the U.K.-Australia air
route in association with Imperial Airways. In 1939, the shares
held by Imperial Airways in Qantas Empire Airways were trans-
ferred to the BOAC.
"After the second world war an agreement was reached between
the governments of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth of
Australia to transfer the shares held by the BOAC to the Govern-
ment of Australia. In February 1947 the Commonwealth Govern-
ment of Australia definitely acquired the 50% interest in Qantas
held by the BOAC. The remaining 50% was privately held, chiefly
by private and business interests in Australia. Subsequently, the
Australian Government announced that it intended to assume full
control of Qantas Empire Airways, Ltd., and accordingly the Com-
monwealth Government has acquired 100% ownership of Qantas as
of 1 July 1947." 82
Qantas and BOAC continue to maintain their intimate cooperation
in scheduling and operations on the important route linking the grow-
ing Commonwealth of Australia to the United Kingdom. Their use of
identical equipment simplifies maintenance at either end of the line.
Two years after the creation of Qantas, in September of 1936, the
governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom
"agreed upon the establishment of a joint company for the operation of
the trans-Tasman air service." 83 The plan called for a New Zealand
carrier, i.e., an operating company registered in New Zealand, to run
scheduled services between Australia and New Zealand. This program
was implemented by the specific provisions of the tri-partite Agreement
of April 10, 1940 in which the three governments concurred on the
"Memorandum and Articles of Association" of an operating company
registered in New Zealand as Tasman Empire Airways Limited.
New Zealand recently informed ICAO that "the Company was
inaugurated on 26 April 1940, upon a financial basis comprising Share
Capital subscribed by its shareholders, plus a subsidy contributed by
the Governments of United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand,
with no payment for carriage of mails. This basis continued until 1st
July 1946 when the subsidy was discontinued and, in lieu thereof, the
Company was paid for carriage of mails at an agreed rate." 34
Originally, B.O.A.C. held 38% of the shares, the New Zealand gov-
82 ICAO Doe. 4954, AT/633-Australia, p. 3.
83 New Zealand paper on international ownership submitted to 4th ICAO
Assembly, A4-WP/39 EC/7, 25/5/50, p. 17.8Ibid, p. 21.
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ernment 20%, Union Airways of N. Z. 19%, and Qantas Empire
Airways 23%. Union Airways was acquired by the New Zealand gov-
ernment in 1947. The stock distribution was modified in 1948 and
today B.O.A.C. owns 20%, Qantas Empire Airways 30%, and the gov-
ernment of New Zealand 50%. Each of the three partners nominates a
pair of directors.
"Under an Agreement of 16 December 1941, made between the
Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand
on one hand and Tasman Empire Airways Limited on the other
hand, this company undertook to maintain and operate regular and
efficient air transport services in direction between the Australian
terminus and the New Zealand terminus. The frequency of these
services, the timetables and rates for carriage were subject to the
approval of the Governments.
"The aircraft employed on these services should be registered in
New Zealand. The Agreement itself should be deemed to have been
made in New Zealand and should be interpreted according to New
Zealand law.
"Any difference or dispute arising between the Governments or
any of them and the company relating to this Agreement should be
settled by arbitration." 35
The Agreement provided that each country would name one mem-
ber of a "Tasman Air Commission" which would act by majority vote.
The official Instrument of Authorization to the Tasman Air Commis-
sion was signed by the three nations on February 23, 1945, and it
authorized the Commission:
"(1) to supervise the execution of the Agreement between the three Gov-
ernments and the operating company and for that purpose to nego-
tiate such matters and conduct and order such periodical and special
investigations into the finance, administration and operation of the
service, and call for such requests from the operating company as
may be required by any of the three Governments or deemed neces-
sary by the Commission. It shall report to the three Governments;
(2) to consider the report upon any proposals relating to the operation
of any civil air service between Australia and New Zealand other
than the service operated under the Agreement;
(3) to call for the performance by the operating company of its duties
under the Agreement and in default of such steps as the Commis-
sion thinks necessary;
(4) to agree upon alternative or additional termini, to approve frequen-
cies, timetables and rates;
(5) to inspect the books of account and vouchers of the operating com-
pany." 6
These responsibilities are no longer vested in the Commission, for
one of the functions assigned to the South Pacific Air Transport Coun-
cil 37 in 1946 was:
5 lbid, p. 18.
86 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
87 "At a Civil Aviation Conference held at Wellington in February and March
1946, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and
the Western Pacific High Commission, agreed to the establishment of an advisory
body, to be known as the South Pacific Air Transport Council, being a regional
organization linked with the Commonwealth Air Transport Council, which con-
sists of representatives of all British Commonwealth Governments." Ibid, p. 19.
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"to advise member Governments on the policy of operation, develop-
ment and finance of air services operated or controlled jointly by
the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zea-
land, on the regional trans-Tasman route." 88
When the South Pacific Air Transport Council held its first meet-
ing in Canberra in December 1946, it determined to create a standing
trans-Tasman Committee composed of representatives of the U.K., Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. That body would take over from the Tasman
Commission on March 31, 1947 and would be under the SPATC. The
second meeting resulted in a basic policy directive to guide TEA's man-
agement. At the end of 1948, the standing committee was replaced by
a Tasman Empire Airways Policy Committee.8 9
British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines
Another Commonwealth effort is the British Commonwealth Pa-
cific Airlines, conceived after the Inter-Dominion Conference on avia-
tion at Montreal in 1944 and discussed at the London meeting of the
Commonwealth Air Transport Council in July 1945 and the Welling-
ton session of the CATC in March of 1946. The objective was to estab-
lish a "British" carrier to operate between Australia-New Zealand and
North America across the Pacific to complete the "British" global net-
work of air services and communications. Final plans were made by
the U.K., Australia and New Zealand at Canberra in March of 1946.
BCPA was incorporated as an Australian firm on June 24, 1946 under
the Companies Act of New South Wales with Australia putting up
50%, New Zealand 30% and the U.K. 20% of the authorized capital of
one million Australian pounds. It began its own trans-Pacific services
with four DC-4 aircraft on April 25, 1948, having previously utilized
Australian National Airways' organization under contract.
Beginnings of the Scandinavian Airline Consortium - S.A.S.
At the same time that these joint programs were developing within
the British Commonwealth, the three Scandinavian states were going
ahead with their own plans for the airline which was to become the out-
standing example of international ownership in civil aviation. Nor-
way initiated negotiations in 1938 for a common carrier with Sweden
and Denmark to North America, and by the beginning of 1940 conver-
sations between the Scandinavian postal officials, the airlines and the
American authorities had reached a point which indicated the possibil-
ity of a line in cooperation with Pan American Airways. Although the
invasion of Norway and Denmark crippled the project, the Swedish car-
rier A.B. Aerotransport went ahead and requested financial aid from its
government. The latter felt that private enterprise should take the
risks alone, so a new Swedish Intercontinental Airlines (SILA) was
88 Id.
89 This became necessary when Canada, a non-shareholder in TEA, joined the
SPATC.
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formed to operate internationally while the state-owned ABA would
handle the European operation. The two companies cooperated con-
siderably.
With the consent of ABA, SILA opened negotiations with the Dan-
ish and Norwegian carriers. The occupied states sent secret negotiators
to Sweden via underground channels, and there were talks with the
Royal Norwegian Air Transport Board which had been set up in Lon-
don in 1943 to plan for the post-war period. The three governments
agreed that cooperation was desirable and that aircraft should be or-
dered as soon as possible. SILA represented the three,carriers in the
United States, and in November 1943 a contract was signed for the pur-
chase of DC-4 equipment from Douglas. The Scandinavian govern-
ments had already exchanged landing rights with the U.S. and Sweden
was training crews for trans-Atlantic operations with B-17's forced
down within its borders when the war ended.
Negotiations were resumed and progressed fairly steadily. "There
had been no opportunities during the war in Denmark or in Norway, as
there had been in Sweden, for building up an organization and for
recruiting and training personnel. Thus the three parties were not
equally well prepared for the task. But in spite of this inequality there
was an unanimous opinion that collaboration was necessary if Scandi-
navian aviation should be able to hold its own in the field of interna-
tional competition." 40
The history of those stormy days seems even more remarkable now:
".... arrangements for a joint traffic were pushed ahead as though
complete agreement had been reached on all points, even when
sometimes during 1945 and 1946 it looked as though nothing would
ever be finally settled. Planes were bought, personnel recruited and
trained and offices opened in the USA and in South America. The
agreement which was finally reached on the morning of the 1st Au-
gust 1946 has proved itself to the satisfaction of all parties. The
greatest difficulty was to find the most suitable form of collabora-
tion. It was clear that there could be no question of setting up a
corporation since a corporation would have to be registered either
as Danish, Norwegian or Swedish." 41
The solution was found in the creation of a consortium, a type of
enterprise familiar to DNL's Thomas Falck Jr. who had long been ac-
tive in a Bergen maritime consortium regulating Norwegian shipping
to South America. The agreement covered scheduled air services from
Scandinavia to the Western Hemisphere, and provided, inter alia:
"2. The Consortium-as such-is not a separate legal person, but shall
externally to the public and internally to its staff appear as one
unit...
3. The management of the Corporation shall be vested in a Board of
Trustees (hereinafter called the Board), under which there shall be
a Managing Director (hereinafter called the President). The
division of the competency between these two instances shall sub-
40 The Story of Scandinavian Airlines System, p. 2.
41 Id.
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stantially be the same as between the Board of Directors and the
President in a stock company.
The Board shall consist of six members, two appointed by DDL,
two by DNL and two by SILA (one of whom from AB Aerotrans-
port-hereinafter called ABA).
Decisions of the Board shall be sustained by a majority vote and
in case of a tie the Chairman shall cast the deciding vote.
In order to change the existing agreement, however, an unani-
mous vote shall be required. Also unanimity shall be required to
appoint the President, who, however, may be dismissed by a major-
ity of votes.
4. The Contracting Parties at their own expense shall procure such
aircraft as may be necessary for the operations, such aircraft to be
made available to the Consortium (see §7). It is the obligation of
the Contracting Parties to arrange for insurance of the aircraft
against all usual risks. The cost of this insurance shall be de-
frayed by the Contracting Parties.
It shall be the duty of the Board from time to time to make deci-
sions concerning acquisition of substitutions for damaged aircraft
or possible additions to the fleet, as defined in this agreement. The
equipment to be made available to the Consortium by the Contract-
ing Parties shall to the extent possible be in proportion to the
respective shares each Contracting Party holds in the Consortium.
5. An organizational plan for the activities and staff of the Consor-
tium shall be presented by the President for adoption by the Board.
The staff for the administrative and technical departments includ-
ing traffic, shall be made available to the Consortium by the Con-
tracting Parties in accordance with agreements between the Board
and the Contracting Parties. Such staff shall remain in the service
of their respective companies but be subject to the strict jurisdic-
tion of the Consortium, by whom they will be paid.
To the greatest possible extent the staff shall be of Danish, Nor-
wegian or Swedish nationality. Equal distribution between the
three nationalities should be attempted.
In Denmark, Norway and Sweden the Contracting Parties and
ABA shall make available their organizations for traffic and sales
service, as well as station service in the respective countries.
In South and North America separate undertakings shall be
established in order to handle the traffic, sales and ground organiza-
tion in the respective countries. These undertakings shall buy or
rent offices and other facilities necessary for the air traffic, and
shall employ their staffs. These undertakings shall be owned by the
Contracting Parties mutually in proportion to their shares in the
Consortium (see §7).
In other countries outside Denmark, Norway and Sweden the
Consortium shall procure offices and other facilities at its discre-
tion. Offices and other facilities owned or rented by SILA in these
countries are hereby transferred to the Consortium at cost price.
Concerning repairs and maintenance, desired by the Board,
agreements shall be concluded with ABA, DDL, DNL or other
organization.
The cost of the daily maintenance and usual overhauls shall be
charged to the Consortium.
The owners of the aircraft may decide where the overhauls shall
be made.
6. Sufficient means for the operation of the Consortium shall be con-
tributed by the Contracting Parties in proportion to the shares in
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the Consortium (§7). Such subscribed working capital shall carry
no interest.
7. When calculating the net result it shall be noted that all expendi-
tures and revenues in connection with the air services and other
activities of the Consortium shall respectively be credited or
charged to the Consortium unless otherwise stipulated in this agree-
ment. Further, to each company shall be credited an amount rep-
resenting the fee paid for chartering the aircraft placed at the
disposal of the Consortium from the time the aircraft may be put
in service according to §§ 4 and 5. This fee shall be equivalent to
the amortization of the purchasing price of the aircraft during a
period of 6 years plus an annual interest of 6 per cent of the value
of the aircraft subsequent to the annual amortization. Agreements
as to chartering of aircraft should be identical.
Subsequently the net results of the operations of the Consor-
tium shall be divided between the Contracting Parties in proportion
to their shares which shall be: for DDL two sevenths; DNL two
sevenths; and SILA three sevenths.
If aircraft belonging to one of the parties should be utilized
to a considerably larger extent than aircraft belonging to the other
parties, the former should be credited a reasonable compensation
for increased expenditures in connection herewith.
11. In the event a member of the Board objects to a decision reached
through a vote of the Board relative to an important question in
connection with efficient operation, such as acquisition of material
or contribution of additional capital, appointment of the President,
or other questions of considerable importance to the Contracting
Party he represents, he shall have the right to give notice of expira-
tion of this agreement within one month from the day the objec-
tionable decision was reached. The agreement shall then expire
after a 6 months period, provided, however, that ordinarily notice
of expiration may be given on January 1 and July 1. The Consor-
tium shall then liquidate at the end of the 6 months period for
which notice of expiration has been given. In case of serious dis-
agreement as to the interpretation of this provision, the matter
shall be submitted to the Board of arbitrators provided for in
§ 1 3 . ', 4 2
A few weeks after this epoch making agreement was signed, the first
SAS plane took off for New York and the great experiment had begun.
The Board named as President Per A. Norlin, a young and able airline
executive in Europe and a Swedish delegate on the 1939-1940 mission
to the United States. The next route opened on November 30, 1946
when Scandinavia was linked with Montevideo via Lisbon, Dakar, Rec-
ife and Rio de Janeiro. A month later, this service was extended to
Buenos Aires.
It was not easy at first, but each partner had something to contrib-
ute to the joint effort. Sweden could supply excellent maintenance
facilities at Bromma Airport outside Stockholm, as well as dollars to
buy U.S. equipment. Norway had trained crews ready for trans-ocean
flying. Denmark had the experience of DDL and a fine international
airport in Kastrup, sky crossroads of northern Europe. SAS hired a
42 Official notarized translation of consortium text.
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number of American and British pilots, as well as U.S. citizen Peter
Redpath to be Vice President in charge of operations.
The commercial direction was soon settled at Bromma, and addi-
tional facilities were constructed there. The DC-4 transports which
had replaced SILA's converted B-17's soon gave way in turn to modern
DC-6 equipment, and the maintenance shops were improved and ex-
panded.
The results of this determined effort to make the Scandinavian tes:
of international ownership and cooperation a success may be seen in
part in the following statistics:
North America Route 1946 1947 1948 Total, 1946-1948
Flights 104 610 631 1,345
Kilometers 713,592 4,140,000 4,180,000 9,033,592
Passengers 2,079 16,327 20,276 38,682
Baggage (kilo) 52,488 382,000 482,442 916,930
Freight (kilo) 52,220 218,889 194,612 465,721
Mail (kilo) 26,862 131,810 135,927 294,599
South America Route
Flights 5 97 168 270
Kilometers 69,841 1,290,000 2,111,000 3,470,841
Passengers 77 2,755 6,080 8,912
Baggage (kilo) 2,016 71,572 156,236 229,824
Freight (kilo) 422 27,748 79,103 107,273
Mail (kilo) 248 9,731 28,769 38,748
The young consortium grew rapidly, and won the respect of its
many experienced competitors on the North Atlantic. It earned a rep-
utation as one of the most efficient carriers on routes where no quarter
was given or asked. By 1948, SAS had proved itself in the eyes of many
in air transport.
EUROPEAN PROGRAM FOR S.A.S.-E.S.A.S.
Some of the finest minds in Scandinavia and a number of the bes:
air transport men in Europe were concerned with this development ofE
S.A.S. They had the combined experience and business acumen oE
three thrifty nations to draw upon, and from this fund came a number
of astute criticisms of the limited cooperation. The story of how and
why Denmark, Norway and Sweden decided to "pool" their efforts,
within Europe as well, is given in the report of the so-called Little Com-
mittee: 43
"The period immediately after the war placed air traffic in an ex-
ceptional position, the traffic demand being so heavy as to produce
maximum bookings on the international air routes. However, the other
means of communication gradually increased their traffic. Competition
among the air companies grew more intense, and simultaneously the
effects of the international economical and political difficulties were
increasingly felt. In the course of 1947 it became more and more evi-
dent that under the pressure of difficulties from outside it was art
untenable and irrational position to cooperate on the Atlantic routes
and maintain competition in Europe, and that cooperation extended to
48 The "Little Committee" consisted of one representative of each of the
mother companies and functioned as a working group in 1949 to study methods of
streamlining and modernizing the SAS organization.
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comprise also the traffic in Europe would afford possibilities for a more
rational operation. By such extended cooperation competition among
themselves would vanish, 'and greater competitive power outwardly
would be attained, and by a joint traffic planning and a rational utiliza-
tion of the joint fleet a better operational economy would be possible.
"There was another question of great moment. Much work was done
and considerable amounts of money spent-not least in North and
South America-in effort to popularize the SAS lines and the name of
SAS. But when a passenger from one of these countries arrived by SAS
in Europe, and in the home of SAS, Scandinavia, he no more met the
name of SAS, but three different companies, ABA, DDL, and DNL, a
proposition quite incomprehensible to the passenger. It was soon re-
alized, therefore, that if the name and repute of SAS should be widely
known, the SAS insignia must be used in every region of the world
where Scandinavian aircraft operated.
"At a board meeting in SAS in December 1947 the idea of an ex-
tended cooperation was taken up for consideration on the direct proposal
of DNL. The subsequent negotiations resulted in the establishing as
from April 18th, 1948, of joint operations by the three companies of
European as well as domestic routes under the one name of SAS. At the
time it was not ventured to go the whole length and eitablish collabora-
tion in Europe on the same principles as on the Atlantic routes, but
for national reasons each of the companies should continue to exist as
an independent organisation. Each company should operate its share of
the traffic program and defray its own operational costs with the excep-
tion of such costs as were agreed to be shared (including i.a. the joint
ESAS departments in Scandinavia and abroad). The aggregate traffic
revenue was to be pooled like the said mutual costs and shared among
the three companies in proportion to the volume of traffic performed
(ton-kilometers). The joint traffic agreement concluded January 28th-
29th, 1948 was of a temporary nature as it was found desirable to gain
more experience before the collaboration was given a definitive shape.
"Throughout the winter 1948/49 and the spring 1949 negotiations
were conducted among the parties, during which DNL submitted a
proposal (P.M. dated 18.3/49) to the effect that each of the companies
should operate its own route program in Europe for its own account as
regards revenue as well as expenses, but under the SAS insignia, while
the OSAS collaboration should continue unchanged. The proposal fur-
ther suggested joint pool operations of routes on which the parties
competed, collaboration in questions of personnel, technical standardi-
sation, traffic policy, etc. and certain mutual offices abroad. As unanim-
ity on this proposal could not be reached, a meeting of the three Min-
isters of Transport and others was held with representatives of the
three companies. At this meeting questions of principle were discussed,
and the Ministers urged the companies themselves to find a solution
based on a continued collaboration."
S.A.S. has had the attention of some of the outstanding business
leaders in Scandinavia from its inception, and two of these men have
played important roles in the negotiations and progress. They are Swe-
dish banking magnate Marcus Wallenberg and Danish construction
engineering authority Per Kampmann, who have added their vast expe-
rience to the knowledge of air transportation contributed by Per
Norlin of A.B.A. and General Riiser-Larsen of D.N.L. and the states-
manship and legal thinking of Justice Eckhoff of the Norwegian Su-
preme Court. All of these men worked together to conclude a joint
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traffic agreement of June 25, 1949 which created a European program
for S.A.S. to be known as ESAS. The excerpts below from the text re-
veal something of the nature of the hybrid creature which stood some-
where between a pool and a consortium:
"1. Definition, Object and Name. As from January 1st, 1949, ABA,
DDL and DNL establish co-operation in the form of joint traffic.
The transport revenue derived from such joint traffic shall be di-
vided between the parties according to the rules below.
Joint traffic shall mean that the parties operate services on
routes that have been laid down in a traffic program prepared joint-
ly by the parties.
The object of establishing joint traffic is to strengthen the
position outwardly, and to create internally the best possibilities
for rational operation to the benefit of the parties and to the air
traffic of the three countries. The three parties shall in the best
possible way assist and support each other in the joint traffic.
Internally among the parties, and in their relations towards the
Scandinavian civil aviation authorities, the joint traffic shall be
referred to as: Scandinavian Airlines, System, European Division,
or ESAS. Outwardly OSAS as well as ESAS are operated under
the joint name of Scandinavian Airlines System, or SAS. The par-
ties' aircraft shall be painted and decorated in accordance with
the SAS-standard design agreed on, this also applying to aircraft
operated in traffic which does not come within the scope of this
agreement (domestic traffic).
"2. The Parties Individually. The joint traffic does not involve the
establishment of any corporate body, and the parties shall continue
as independent organisations.
"3. Scope. The joint traffic shall comprise all commercial, interna-
tional air traffic with the exception of the present and future traf-
fic operated by OSAS. The domestic traffic operated by the parties
shall not be affected by the joint traffic.
While this agreement remains in force none of the parties may,
without the consent of the other parties, carry on commercial,
international air traffic outside the scope of the joint traffic, or be
interested in other concerns carrying on such traffic.
As regards charter flights within the joint traffic there is con-
cluded a special agreement among the three parties. Therefore,
the provisions of these presents shall apply to scheduled operations
only.
Domestic traffic shall mean traffic where the airport of departure
and destination are located within the realm of the country con-
cerned, and which has no regular commercial landing place outside
the realm of the same country. Consequently, Danish flights to
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and Norwegian flights to Sval-
bard shall be considered as domestic traffic. If on such flights
regular commercial landings are made outside the realm, a special
agreement shall be made among the parties concerning a reasonable
arrangement as to the transport revenue derived from such com-
mercial intermediate landings on international territory.
In case the authorities in the Scandinavian country concerned
as a consequence of the existing concessionary regulations require
one of the parties to operate a certain international traffic which is
not covered by the traffic programme prepared for the joint traffic,
the party concerned shall beforehand offer such traffic to the other
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parties for incorporation in the joint traffic agreement. If such
offer is not accepted the party concerned shall then be free to oper-
ate the traffic for its own account.
"4. The Mutual Economic Responsibility of the Parties. The responsi-
bility towards passengers, cargo and third party shall be borne by
the party hereto whose aircraft (owned or rented) is used for the
flight.
With regard to the financial obligations entered into by the de-
partments duly authorized to do so under the joint traffic by the
board of directors, the parties shall be jointly liable outwardly,
while the mutual obligations shall be divided among the parties
according to the provisions of article 13.
"6. Management. The supreme management of the joint traffic shall
be vested in a board of directors (the ESAS board) which consists
of the same persons as from time to time are members of the OSAS
board of trustees. Each party hereto has one vote on the ESAS
board.
The chairman and 1st and 2nd vice-chairman of the OSAS board
of trustees shall hold the same offices on the ESAS board.
The ESAS board shall nominate a general manager for the
administration of the joint tasks of the joint traffic. Establish-
ment of the joint departments mentioned in article 7, appointments,
discharges, discharges and payment of employees in responsible
positions, and other important matters, shall be considered by the
board. Within the scope of his responsibility, to be further defined
by the ESAS board, the general manager's decisions shall be of
binding effect to all three parties.
The resolutions of the ESAS board shall be unanimous and
the board shall be at proper quorum only when all three parties
are represented. In the event that the board is not at a proper
quorum because not all three parties are represented, each party
may demand that a new meeting be held with a notice of 8 days, and
at that meeting the board will be at a quorum if only two of the
parties are represented. At this meeting only such matters may
be dealt with as were expressly indicated in the agenda of the
first meeting. ...
"7. The Joint Departments. For the purpose of obtaining the most
efficient execution and co-ordination of joint tasks which arise in
connection with the joint traffic, the board may resolve to establish
joint departments which shall be subjected to the general manager
mentioned in article 6. Such departments can only be dissolved by
by a resolution of the board. The joint departments shall be con-
sidered as an administrative unit separate from the parties' own
organizations. In the employment of personnel for more qualified
work and in the training of personnel an even apportionment
among the parties should be endeavored.
"8. The scheduled flights, which the parties are to undertake within
the joint traffic, shall be set forth in a joint traffic programme
which is to be approved by the board.
In the preparation of this traffic programme which shall be
ready for each traffic period in due time before the beginning of the
period (approx. 6 months), the object shall be-with due regard to
the attainment of the most economical operation-to meet the esti-
mated traffic demand. Endeavors should be made to assign the types
of aircraft best suited for the individual routes.
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Within the traffic programmes prepared on these lines, the three
parties shall for the respective calendar year be entitled to the fol-
lowing shares in the total amount of offered normal tonkm.-to
such an extent as the practical arrangement permits: ABA 3/7;
DDL 2/7; DNL 2/7.
The number of normal tonkm. shall be calculated as the normal
payload multiplied by the distance. Normal payload shall be cal-
culated as the average payload of the three parties' aircraft of the
same type, or type variant, which are used in the traffic programme,
this payload being fixed on the basis of the distance calculations and
the corresponding normal tankage of the route analyses. The dis-
tance is calculated according to the shortest distance of the route
analyses between two airports with the addition of 30 km for DC-3
and Vickers Viking, and 40 km for DC-4 and DC-6.
In the preparation and carrying out of the traffic programme
endeavors shall be made to ensure that the parties' utilization in
flying time of the same type of aircraft becomes uniform in so far
as is possible. Each party will be allotted its particular task within
the traffic programme.
"11. Domestic Traffic Programme. The preparation of the traffic pro-
gramme for the parties' domestic traffic shall be undertaken by the
parties themselves. However, in the preparation of the programme
close co-operation shall take place with the joint traffic planning
department in order to obtain a rational utilization of the aircraft
fleet and the possible co-ordination of the domestic and the foreign
traffic.
On the approval of the traffic programme mentioned in article 8,
an arrangement shall be made among the parties as to whether cer-
tain domestic routes, which are essential international connections,
shall, wholly or in part, be incorporated in the joint traffic-pool.
"12. Division of Revenue. All traffic revenue originating from air
transport within the joint traffic shall be divided between the par-
ties in proportion to their (within the joint traffic) actually offered
shares of the aggregate number of tonkm. (within the joint traffic)
actually offered within a calendar year. Extra flights, duplicate
flights and transfer flights shall be included in the calculation of
normal tonkm. Traffic revenue shall mean any payment for com-
pleted or ordered transportation of passengers, baggage, mail and
cargo which the companies may receive in their capacity of carriers.
In the instances in which the parties enter into pool traffic with
other airlines, the amounts of profit thus derived shall be added
to the revenue that is to be divided as outlined above. In case
the assignments to such pool traffic are made on directions different
from those generally adhered to by the parties the parties shall
enter into negotiations for the purpose of establishing the method
of calculation to be applied for the settlement of such traffic.
A statement of the apportionment among the parties of the
transport revenue accumulated during the year shall be made each
month on the basis of the actually offered normal tonkm. accumu-
lated during the same period ....
"13. Apportionment of Expenses. Each party shall in principle defray
the operating expenses in connection with flights performed in the
joint traffic. However, the board of directors may resolve that
certain expenses, by exception, shall be apportioned among the par-
ties, and fix the rules for the apportionment of such expenses ....
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"14. Ground Organization Maintenance. The parties agree to make
available for each other in their respective home countries such
ground organization service as is necessary for their traffic, and
in this connection there is to be made special arrangements which
in principle shall be uniform ...
"19. Foreign Currency. In principle each party shall have its share
in the receipts in foreign currency which is derived from the joint
traffic; likewise, each party. shall in principle make available its
share of the foreign currency necessary for covering joint expenses.
"20. Unreasonable Hardship Resulting from the Joint Traffic. In case
the carrying out the joint traffic according to this agreement ap-
pears to involve unreasonable hardship for one of the parties on
account of unforeseen or unforeseeable circumstances, it is agreed
to take up negotiations with a view to eliminating such hardship.
"22. Termination. If at any time one of the parties is of opinion that
the purpose set forth in article 1 of the establishment of the joint
traffic has not been attained, the party concerned shall be entitled
to terminate the agreement at a notice of not less than 6 months,
such termination to be effective at the end of the traffic season, or
at any other time as the parties may agree upon .... ,, 44
This European Division of S. A. S., with its unusual structure and
highly complex method of operation, set up shop with a staff at its
Copenhagen headquarters and went to work. ESAS had actually been
functioning in a different form since the three mother companies
signed the promemoria developed at the January 28, 29, 1948 Oslo
conference. When ESAS had begun in 1948, it utilized a system of
committees instead of the joint departments inherent in the 1949 agree-
ment. Each such committee had a Dane, Norwegian and a Swede.
They experimented with the delegation of functions, so that the Traf-
fic Committee, for example, soon had the Norwegian doing sales, the
Swede planning and the Dane organization. Viggo Rasmussen, 35
year old DDL executive who had done a brilliant job for the Danish
carrier, had the difficult job of serving as general manager of ESAS
and he quickly realized that "You cannot run an airline with com-
mittees." "I His outspoken recommendations were influential in the
decision to use departments instead.
The 1948-1949 period was a trying one for the Scandinavian Air-
lines System and the mother companies. European traffic was being
divided with many competitors and ESAS was having an abundance
of growing pains. The Danish, Norwegian and Swedish carriers suf-
fered at home from rising costs and the necessity to rationalize rapidly
overexpanded organizations. A lot of unexperienced people had been
hired by the parent companies and SAS in 1946 and 1947, and many of
these had to be fired after expensive training in 1948 and 1949. The
44 Official translation of ESAS Agreement.
45 Statement made to author in August 17, 1950 interview in ESAS head-
quarters at Kastrup Airport outside Copenhagen. Much of the information in
this section of the article is based on personal conversations with the chief execu-
tives of SAS in 1950 and 1951.
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reductions were not among air crews, for OSAS was starting to make
its way to the forefront on the North Atlantic and traffic was coming
along nicely on the route to South America. But excess office personnel
were pared from the payroll. Both ESAS and OSAS found the number
of political problems growing, as increasing international competition
led quite a few countries to impose all sorts of traffic restrictions and
limitations on landing rights. The situation was not too bad for OSAS,
which had made excellent progress under the capable direction of for-
mer-DNL boss Per Backe,46 on the relatively free Atlantic routes.
ESAS, which was operating all over non-communist Europe, most of
the Middle East, and down to Nairobi, was constantly negotiating for
the essential permits and concessions.
In these discussions, the Scandinavians have cleverly used their na-
tional positions to the best advantage. Sweden deals with the United
Kingdom, for example, because the British buy from the Swedes.
Denmark could not handle such talks, as the Danes are dependent on
selling to the U. K. When OSAS was preparing its new service to the
Far East, however, DNL could not participate because of the conces-
sion granted to the private Norwegian carrier S.A.F.E. 47 and the opera-
tion of the other Scandinavian airline created certain political 4s diffi-
culties for OSAS. The discussions for landing rights have been con-
46 Mr. Backe is an able lawyer less than 40 years old, who came to air trans-
port after World War II and got some experience as a DNL executive before join-
ing OSAS. His many talents, not the least of which is a capacity to get along
easily with some of the more nationalistic elements in the consortium, have made
him particularly useful to SAS.
47 S.A.F.E. is the South American and Far Eastern Airlines of wealthy Nor-
wegian shipowner Ludwig Braathens, who began non-scheduled operations after
World War II and developed a lot of business carrying merchant seamen before he
secured a concession from the Norwegian government to initiate regular services
between Oslo and Hong Kong with his small fleet of DC-4 transports.
48 The difficulties are twofold, including problems within Scandinavia as well
as relations with other countries. When Mr. Braathens applied for a permit to
run scheduled services to the Orient, the Norwegian government consulted DNL
and DNL took up the question with ABA and DDL. It was decided that SAS
would not begin its services to the Far East for some time, so DNL indicated to its
government that the partners did not object to the S.A.F.E. operation. Braathens
began flying and was developing some traffic when ABA and DDL urged that SAS
put forward the date of its own operation to the Orient. A large part of the sen-
sitive Norwegian public was aroused by the jingoist branch of the Oslo press
which branded the change as a betrayal, although SAS had never said that it
would not fly to the Pacific. Mr. Braathens charged that heavily subsidized social-
ized corporations were out to destroy his thriving little example of profitable free
enterprise. He won some support from conservative elements in Norway who
were against the Labor Party government which was financing DNL, and he was
backed by a few sensational nationalist papers who use the historic distrust to-
wards Sweden to stir up feelings and stimulate circulation. The Swedes reacted
somewhat touchily to these charges. Meanwhile, public opinion in Norway forced
the government to order DNL not to participate in the Far East service of the
consortium. Outside Scandinavia, there were problems with countries en route to
the Pacific which had already granted landing rights to one Scandinavian carrier,
i.e., S.A.F.E. The U.K. used this as an excuse to keep SAS out of Hong Kong.
Until the line was extended to Tokyo in 1951, SAS had terminated its flights to
Asia at Bangkok. Mr. Braathens has continued his services each week and his
frequent statements to the press denouncing SAS as a betrayal of Norway's fu-
ture in the sky. There are signs that S.A.F.E. is no longer a profitable venture,
and it may not survive the expiration of its permit in 1954.
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ducted by SAS executives, by air transport officials in one or the other
Scandinavian governments, or by mixed delegations. The negotiations
have not been easy, for SAS is a carrier which does not originate too
much traffic from its national termini and which is largely dependent
on Fifth Freedom and local traffic. The Scandinavians can offer ex-
cellent transportation in modern equipment, but they cannot give
very much traffic in exchange. The result is a difficult bargaining posi-
tion. ESAS has been literally forced into at least two pools with terms
that could hardly be classified as attractive.
The mother companies did not do well in 1948, and both OSAS
and ESAS lost money. The financial situation was becoming extremely
precarious for DNL in particular, and it was clear that SAS would have
to find a more economical way to continue. OSAS sold its Boeing 377
Stratocruisers to B.O.A.C. before delivery. After the sale of the small
fleet of Vickers Vikings, the decision was made to standardize insofar
as possible with U. S. aircraft. This was not easy to do, as DNL was
operating JU-52 transports and Sandringham flying boats and ABA 49
had a number of SAAB Scandias 50 on order.
Traffic was fairly good, but expenses were too high. SAS had five
organizations (A.B.A., D.D.L., D.N.L., ESAS, and OSAS) doing the
job of one. There was an enormous amount of duplication, conflict,
and unnecessary paper work. There was also a continuing jockeying
for position within the SAS organization and a struggle for national
profit each time a new ESAS traffic programme was composed. The
provision for division of revenue on the ton-kilometer basis of article
12 of the 1949 agreement encouraged such internal rivalry. There
were also problems created by (1) staff without much experience in
air transport who had to learn (2) personnel with many years of air-
line work who were slow to adopt modern methods and ways of think-
ing. The many efficient members of the SAS team lost a good deal of
time traveling to meetings and conferences almost every week.
There were additional pressures generated by long-standing na-
tional rivalries.51 The financial situation continued to deteriorate, and
in September of 1949 the Norwegian Minister of Transport announced
that he "could not approve the agreement of June 25th, 1949, and
demanded of DNL that they give notice of terminating the agreement
by April 1st, 1950." 52 This would have meant the end of ESAS, and
a great loss of faith in the future of Scandinavian cooperation in the air.
But the men who were guiding SAS were not asleep, and had had
49 ABA took over SILA in 1948.
50 The Scandia was attractive in 1948, but seems a bit out of date as a 1951
plane. Several were sold to Brasil, and it is possible that the consortium may dis-
pose of the others within a few years.
51 These go back to the inter-Scandinavian wars centuries ago, and are also
related to the differences in national size, wealthy, and popular personality. The
tension is strongest between the Norwegians and the Swedes, but it should not be
considered as a major threat to the future.
52 Little Committee Report, p. 5.
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already named a "Little Committee" of three Is to investigate possible
reforms. The excerpts below from their report are the first selections
from the official text of that secret document which SAS has authorize&
to be published:
"The committee has endeavored to establish the status of the most
important advantages and disadvantages embodied in the collaboration
and expresses its opinion to the effect that the advantages gained in the
collaboration are so momentous-viewed from an aviation aspect as well
as national, Scandinavian interests-that a collaboration in a ration-
alised and judicious shape ought to be maintained, and that it would
be a misfortune for all parties if the collaboration were dissolved. The
committee will carry general social interests for the three countries, and
that only by such operation is it possible to cover Scandinavian air traf-
fic demand now and in the future in a manner satisfactory to Scandi-
navia.
"The committee believes . . . that through a radical change of the
joint organisation considerable reduction of expenditure is possible....
The proposal put forward for consideration by the committee proposes
the entire SAS consortium to be governed as one concern on joint ac-
count and risk under one board and one managing director. The proposal
implies the formation of a SAS consortium to take over the entire
operation of the concern. Aircraft and buildings are to remain the
property of the individual mother companies. ABA, DDL, and DNL
are to hold shares in this consortium in certain proportions. ABA,
DDL, and DNL will continue to exist as independent national limited
liability companies, their operations, however, to be effected purely in
their solidarily responsible partnerships in the SAS consortium.
"Advantages.
. ..Because the revenue of all the lines of this program is
pooled and thus benefit all three companies, there is no individual
advantage in operating the 'fat' rather than the 'meager' lines of
the program. The joint traffic program can, therefore, be prepared
rationally to the greatest advantage of all three parties .... This
rationalisation of operations have opened far better possibilities
of attaining good bookings in proportion to the existing traffic
potential. The joint fleet of aircraft too proffer great advantages,
facilitating more effective utilisation of each aircraft, and a re-
duced number of reserve aircraft and stock of spare parts.
The joint traffic program also allows coordination of all SAS
lines inside as well as outside Europe into one routing network,
which has given good results in carrying traffic to and from the
inter-continental routes. . . . The joint offices abroad in reality
means a saving compared with what an equally effective sales effort
would cost the three companies when working individually. ...
. .. SAS have gained a foothold on the international routes,
which undoubtedly would have been extremely difficult separately
in view of the increasing difficulties in obtaining the freedoms re-
quired for scheduled air transport .... The SAS collaboration and
the ensuing cooperation of Denmark's, Norway's and Sweden's
foreign ministers and air authorities have made it possible to ne-
gotiate on equal basis with foreign governments and competing
53in August of 1949, Einar Isdahl (DNL), Per Kampmann (DDL), and
Marcus Wallenberg (ABA) began their investigation of the future changes in the
SAS.
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companies, and to exert a power unobtainable by the individual
company....
"Disadvantages.
' * .the home organisation of the three mother companies and
the two joint concerns-OSAS and ESAS-with five managements
is vague, complicated, and costly. Questions of even little impor-
tance have to be agreed by all these concerns, and it is difficult in
practice to comply with the lines of reference on competence when
decisions have to be made...
much double work is done, as they each do every type of work re-
quired for the operation of an air company. It has also been experi-
enced that in several instances the three companies are not availing
themselves of the full consequences of the collaboration as they
still perform certain types of work which could cheaper and more
effectively be done by the joint departments, and vice versa ...
The system according to which the revenue of the joint traffic
is divided in proportion to the tonne kilometres flown by each of the
three companies tends to entail sectionalism. The individual com-
panies see their interests in performing as many tonne kilometres
as possible of the traffic program scheduled so as to secure the larg-
est possible percentual share of the traffic pool. It is also of inter-
est to the individual companies to operate with the material re-
quiring the lowest operational cost per tonnekm., and hangar work
too gives rise to separate interests, and so does the unequal division
of the various types of the aircraft fleet....
The heavy organisation at home, and the many separate finan-
cial interests of the individual companies occasion a large number
of meetings, preparation of a large number of reciprocal calcula-
tions and detailed information, partly of the daily work and partly
for submission to the managements and to SAS's board. Such
work is non-productive and binds-on the part of the board as well
as large parts of the staff-efforts and initiative of which the nor-
mal operation is thus deprived. The inter-company accounting
system is extremely complex and costly...
The complex nature of the internal organisation involves diffi-
culties in the cooperation with the air authorities of the three
countries, who are interested in distinctly defined responsibilities...
"The agreement should be concluded for a long term of years (20-25
years). . . . In order to attain clear lines of reference and to avoid
financially separate interests SAS should take over every branch of in-
dustry that the mother companies operate jointly or separately....
"As the three mother companies are jointly and severally responsible
for the liabilities of the consortium, it is considered necessary that the
capital and financial resources are adapted to each company's share in
SAS .... The scope of operation, the size of the organisation and the
fleet should as far as possible be adapted to the current traffic potential,
and extension of international operations should be undertaken when-
on shorter or longer terms-it is deemed justifiable from a business
point of view ....
"In each of the three capitals will be appointed a regional manager
... the three local managers shall be responsible to the managing di-
rector . . . the committee suggests that . . the managing director
hold office until further is estabilshed in Stockholm ....
"In the judgment of the committee the change in organisation may
occasion the total savings of about 14 million Danish kroner in all on a
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cost budget like the one of about 1761/2 million for 1949--or about 8%.
"Aircraft and buildings to be placed at the disposal of SAS against
payment of a fee to the owner company. To avoid sectionalism in
fixing the amount of such fees the inter-change of aircraft among the
companies ought presumably to be done in such a way that they will
possess a number of each type which as far as possible corresponds
to their number of shares in the consortium.
"It is of great moment that an arrangement is made as soon as at
all possible. As is well understandable, much uncertainty and disquiet
prevail within the three mother companies and in OSAS and ESAS
after it has become known that negotiations on a new organisation are
taking place, and particularly after it has become known that the
Norwegian Ministry of Transport has refused acceptance of the joint
traffic agreement. It is praiseworthy that the working spirit and efforts
do not seem to have been much influenced by it as yet, but it does not
serve the interests of the companies that these uncertain conditions
continue. It is also the staff's due that peaceful working conditions
and security for the future is established as soon as possible."
The report of the Little Committee was a turning point, which
marked out the route which was to lead to a single efficient consortium
in which the mother companies participate only as holding companies.
The leaders of Scandinavian civil aviation thought long and hard
about the down to earth recommendations of the three experts, and
the months of negotiations began. There were some airline executives
who were quite open in their opposition to the plan, both for national-
istic and personal reasons. The question was discussed in many news-
papers, for the essence of the proposal was given to the press. While,
some people said that it could not be done and others that it should
not be done, men like Marcus Wallenberg and Per Kampmann knew
that the Scandinavian countries had to consolidate their efforts in one
operating airline. Commentators in many countries have criticized.
the idea of international ownership as a distant dream, hardly feasible,
today. A dozen persuasive reasons have been advanced to prove that.
it was not .practical. Yet it was the so called realists who were proven
to be the theoreticians, for the executives of the three governments;
and couriers went to work and talked it out carefully. They held.
scores of meetings in 1950, ranging from top level diplomatic confer.,
ences to routine sessions of working groups of specialists. The driving
forces were Wallenberg and Kampmann, a financier and a master
engineer. They were both practical men who had made fortunes before
entering aviation, and they joined their common sense and desire for
Scandinavian cooperation with the air transport know-how of Messrs.
Norlin, Backe and Rasmussen. The result was a new consortium agree..
ment which was submitted to the Norwegian parliament, then the!
Danish, then the Swedish. The opponents of the measure denounced.
it bitterly in the Oslo press, but it was accepted. The Danish cabinet:
fell, but the new government approved the pact. There was no trouble
in Sweden.
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On February 8, 1951, the agreement establishing the new SAS
consortium was signed in Oslo. It is to last for 25 years, and it em-
bodies the recommendations of the Little Committee. It is very
probably not a perfect agreement, but it will do as a working document
for the men who will run SAS. There is but one airline now, and it
will be run as a business. SAS exists because some very experienced
Scandinavians believe that a single carrier in consortium form is the
most economical way for the three countries to engage in scheduled
air services. They do not regard it as a form of "denationalization"
which will lead to air disarmament; they do not worry too much about
the glories of international cooperation or the elimination of rivalries.
SAS is not an instrument of any grand project; it is an airline and its
management means to make money. The three governments mean
to get efficient air service at a low cost, and to develop an enterprise
which is an operating air transport reserve.
The new SAS is getting settled at Bromma Airport outside Stock-
holm, where President Norlin and Vice Presidents Rasmussen and
Backe are building their organization. They have ordered more DC-6s
and a score of Convairs. They are looking to the future as practical
men, striving for a rationalized carrier and convinced that the new
consortium will succeed. Other countries may study the evolution of
the Scandinavian Airlines System, and ,it will surely be treated in the
survey of cooperation in international civil aviation which the French
Air Transport Institute is preparing for ICAO. There is a lesson to be
seen, one which the Scandinavians learned over many years. The idea
of joint ownership was originally rejected by Carl Florman of ABA in
a 1933 paper to the Air Transport Committee of the International
Chamber of Commerce, but he later came to understand the possible
benefits. The moral is that (1) it is not necessary for each country to
have a national carrier (2) few nations can afford extensive interna-
tional air services (3) countries which want to engage in such opera-
tions can do so in some form of joint venture (4) and it will have a
good chance of success if the people of those countries want it badly
enough to divorce their joint airline from petty politics and run it as
a business. For SAS means business.
